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Introduction
THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION recently reported that
a staggering seventy-two percent of medical school students accumu-
late a minimum of $100,000 of educational debt prior to graduation.'
Similarly, the Law School Admissions Council determined that the av-
erage law school student who borrows both government-insured and
private loans graduates with $90,000 in educational debt.2 Not only
are these current figures astounding, but the financial burden on stu-
dents is growing every year. The average level of indebtedness of grad-
uating medical students increased by 8.5% from 2005 to 2006,3 and in
the last year alone, the University of San Francisco School of Law in-
creased tuition from $29,057 to $33,790. 4 While educational costs are
on the rise, salaries in the legal and medical professions are not keep-
ing pace. In 2005, the average third-year medical resident earned an
after-tax income of only $33,083. 5 In 2007, attorneys employed at
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1. Am. Med. Ass'n, Medical Student Debt, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/cate-
gory/5349.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2007).
2. Law Sch. Admission Council, Financial Aid: Repayment, http://www.lsac.org/
LSAC.asp?url=/Lsac/financial-aid-repayment.asp (last visited Aug. 10, 2007).
3. Am. Med. Ass'n, supra note 1.
4. Univ. of S.F., Cost of Attendance, Tuition & Fees, http://www.usfca.edu/law/
prospective/shared-content/FinancialAid/tuition%26fees.htm (last visited Aug. 10, 2007).
5. U.C. Davis Sch. of Med., Financial Aid, http://www.ucdmc.ucdavis.edu/ome/
finaid/debt3.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2007).
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small law firms were projected to earn as little as $46,000 in their first
year.6
As students continue to borrow funds to finance education, grad-
uates unable to repay educational loans may be forced to consider
bankruptcy as a method of reducing or eliminating debt liabilities.
Student loans, however, are classified as nondischargeable debts
under the current Bankruptcy Code, 7 which prevents most former stu-
dents from avoiding repayment of educational loans through
bankruptcy. 8
Recognizing the potentially harsh consequences of this bright-
line prohibition, Congress provided one exception to the rule: a
debtor may discharge educational debt if he or she demonstrates that
repayment would impose "undue hardship" on the debtor or the
debtor's dependents.9 Congress, however, did not specify what consti-
tutes "undue hardship,"'10 and courts consequently developed tests to
determine whether a debtor's degree of hardship is sufficiently "un-
due" to warrant discharge."' The Second Circuit articulated the most
prominent hardship analysis in Brunner v. New York State Higher Educa-
tion Services.12 Under the three-part Brunner test, repayment of student
6. Law College Journal from the Wall Street Journal, http://www.collegejournal.
com/salarydata/law/ (last visited Aug. 10, 2007).
7. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (8) (2000); Ekenasi v. Educ. Res. Inst. (In reEkenasi), 325 F.3d
541, 545 (4th Cir. 2003).
8. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8); Kielisch v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Kielisch), 258
F.3d 315, 320 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting IRS v. Cousins, 209 F.3d 38, 40 (1st Cir. 2000)).
Debtors ordinarily "remain personally responsible for their non-dischargeable student loan
debts, and those debts pass or ride through the bankruptcy unaffected and are a post-
bankruptcy liability for the former debtor." Kiehzsch, 258 F.3d at 320.
9. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (8); see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 727, 1328(a)(2).
10. Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Long), 322 F.3d 549, 554 (8th Cir. 2003)
(noting that the "Bankruptcy Code does not define the phrase and courts have struggled
with its meaning").
11. Id. ("A divergent body of appellate authority has attempted to unwrap the 'undue
hardship' enigma.").
12. Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Serv. Corp. (In re Brunner), 46 B.R. 752
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985), affd, 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987). This Comment focuses on the
inadequacies of the Brunner test because Brunner is followed in nine circuits. See infra note
46. However, the minority totality-of-the-circumstances test used in the Eighth Circuit suf-
fers from a similar lack of timing language and is consequently subject to the same timing
debate as Brunner. See Bender v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Bender), 297 B.R. 126,
132 (Bankr. D. Neb. 2003), affd, 368 F.3d 846 (8th Cir. 2004). When faced with the issue of
when, during a Chapter 13 case, the totality-of-the-circumstances test applies, the Eighth
Circuit concluded that "[als a matter of law ... the question of dischargeability under
§ 523(a) (8) should not hinge upon the [debtors'] current financial condition, but, rather
should be dependent upon their ability to pay off the loans after emerging from bank-
ruptcy protection." Bender, 297 B.R. at 132. The Bender court, however, has since been criti-
cized as adding "a judicial gloss to § 523(a) (8) by defining the issue as whether undue
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loans constitutes "undue hardship" if: (1) the debtor cannot maintain,
based on current income and expenses, a minimal standard of living if
forced to repay the loans; (2) the state of affairs will likely persist for a
significant portion of the repayment period; and (3) the debtor has
made a good-faith effort to repay the loan. 1 3
Absent from the Brunner test is an explanation of when a court
should apply the Brunner factors. It is unclear whether courts should
apply the factors to circumstances as they exist at the time of general
discharge or to circumstances at the time a debtor files a dis-
chargeability action, even if the action is filed prior to discharge. In
Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings, where a debtor's assets are liqui-
dated to repay creditors, Brunner's timing ambiguity has little bearing
on the hardship analysis because Chapter 7 cases are short in dura-
tion 14 and result in a quick discharge of unsecured dischargeable
debts. 15 Chapter 13 cases, however, require a debtor to adhere to a
repayment plan that may extend up to five years, and discharge of
dischargeable debts occurs only at the completion of a debtor's repay-
ment plan.16 Due to the length of a Chapter 13 case, a debtor who
seeks a dischargeability determination years before the bankruptcy
case closes necessarily does so years before discharge is scheduled to
occur.
1 7
hardship exists at the time of discharge." Coleman v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Cole-
man), 333 B.R. 841, 849 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2005).
13. Brunner, 46 B.R. at 756.
14. Ekanasi, 325 F. 3d at 546. Courts typically grant Chapter 7 discharge four months
after the debtor petitions for bankruptcy. See also U.S. Courts, The Discharge In Bank-
ruptcy-Bankruptcy Basics, http://www.uscourts.gov/bankruptcycourts/bankruptcy
basics/discharge.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2007).
15. Debtors are permitted to seek dischargeability determinations during the bank-
ruptcy case, or may petition to reopen the bankruptcy case once closed to determine dis-
chargeability issues. Raisor v. Educ. Loan Serv. Ctr. (In reRaisor), 180 B.R. 163, 167 (Bankr.
E.D. Tex. 1995); 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 523.04 (Alan N. Resnick & HenryJ. Sommer
eds., 15th ed., rev. 2007). In either case, the court need not speculate as to the debtor's
financial state at the time of discharge, as discharge is either imminent or has already
occurred. 9 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra, 4004.04[1] ("Rule 4004(c) requires that the
CHAPTER 7 DISCHARGE be entered forthwith as soon as the TIME for objecting to the DIs-
CHARGE and the time for the United States trustee to move to dismiss the case under Rule
1017(e), including any extension granted on motion, has expired. This requirement is
designed to bring about an expeditious discharge in chapter 7 cases and a prompt fresh
start for the debtor once there is no longer any possibility that a discharge will be denied
or that the case will be dismissed, even if the administration of the estate will continue for
some time." (internal citations omitted)).
16. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(d), 1328(a), 1307(a) (2000).
17. See, e.g., Ekenasz, 325 F.3d at 547 (noting that "[w]here an adversary proceeding
seeking discharge of a student loan obligation is brought early in a Chapter 13 case ...
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The difference in timing between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 dis-
charge is critical in hardship analysis-Chapter 13 requires the suc-
cessful completion of a plan before a discharge is granted, while
Chapter 7 does not. When faced with the question of when to apply
Brunner in Chapter 13 cases, some courts dismiss dischargeability ac-
tions as premature if filed prior to discharge. 18 In contrast, other
courts apply the Brunner test to a debtor's circumstances as they exist
at the time a dischargeability action is filed, regardless of when in the
Chapter 13 repayment plan the action is brought. 19
This differing treatment is an unintended consequence of the
Brunner test as applied to Chapter 13 debtors, and this result is not
surprising given Brunner's implicit requirement that the factors be ap-
plied to a specific, yet unspecified, point in time. In failing to specify
when in the bankruptcy case the test applies, however, the Brunner
court's definition of "undue hardship" consequently produces inequi-
table and inconsistent results in the context of Chapter 13. Some
Chapter 13 debtors receive a hardship determination when they file a
dischargeability proceeding, while other Chapter 13 debtors must wait
until discharge to receive such determination. 20
This inequity may be easily eliminated by amending the Brunner
test to include a uniform timing standard. The question remains, how-
ever, at what time should the test apply? Because the statutory excep-
tion lacks timing language, and because Congress intends to
encourage filings under Chapter 13 over filings under Chapter 7,21
the Brunner test should apply at the time a debtor files a dis-
chargeability action. This solution is permitted under the Bankruptcy
Code, 22 follows congressional intent,23 matches the debtor-friendly na-
ture of bankruptcy law, and most importantly, would provide equal
treatment to all individual debtors regardless of the chapter filed or
jurisdiction chosen.
[the court must predict] what the debtor's situation will be at the conclusion of the Chap-
ter 13 plan which, as here, may extend up to five years").
18. See, e.g., Raisor, 180 B.R. at 167; Bender v. Educ. Credit Mgmt Corp. (In re
Bender), 297 B.R. 126, 133 (Bankr. D. Neb. 2003), affd, 368 F.3d 846 (8th cir. 2004); Pair
v. U.S. Dep't of Educ. (In re Pair), 269 B.R. 719, 720 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2001).
19. See, e.g., Strahm v. Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp. (In re Strahm), 327 B.R. 319,
321 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2005); Coleman v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Coleman), 333
B.R. 841, 846 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2005).
20. See supra notes 18 and 19 and accompanying text.
21. See infra Part II.B.
22. Coleman, 333 B.R. at 849 (noting that there "is no express statutory prohibition on
determining this issue before the discharge is granted").
23. See infra Part II.B.
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Although this amendment, standing alone, may produce undesir-
able consequences, courts can avoid such issues by retaining jurisdic-
tion of the dischargeability action until discharge occurs. If courts
resolve all hardship proceedings when filed, it is possible that more
debtors will find their student loan obligations discharged based on
then-present circumstances than if the test was applied at the time of
discharge. 24 For example, a debtor's income may increase over the
course of the repayment plan, and the discharge of other unsecured
debts at the completion of a repayment plan may assist the debtor in
repaying student loans. 25 To avoid this problem and to prevent dis-
charge of debt payable without undue hardship, courts should apply
Brunner at the time hardship proceedings are filed and reserve juris-
diction over the dischargeability determination until discharge actu-
ally occurs. This would give educational lenders the opportunity to
vacate a dischargeability determination if a debtor's financial health
improves sufficiently during the course of the Chapter 13 repayment
plan. Under this proposed solution, courts would be permitted to con-
sider the merits of all dischargeability actions when filed, while pro-
tecting lenders from the discharge of student loans whose repayment
does not constitute undue hardship on the debtor or the debtor's
dependents.
This Comment argues that to ensure that every debtor receives
equitable treatment with respect to the hardship exception, and to
better follow congressional intent, the Brunner definition should be
amended to include a timing standard that requires courts to uni-
formly apply Brunner at the time a debtor files a dischargeability ac-
tion. Furthermore, courts should maintain jurisdiction over hardship
determinations until discharge occurs to prevent discharge of debts
payable without undue hardship. Part I provides a background of the
discharge provisions provided for in bankruptcy, analyzes the hard-
ship exception to student loan nondischargeability, and introduces
the Brunner test as the prevailing definition of undue hardship. Part II
analyzes Brunner as applied to Chapter 13 debtors. Part III explores
the ripeness issue in Chapter 13 cases. Part IV sets forth the reasons
why a resolution of the timing issue is necessary to adequately evaluate
a Chapter 13 debtor's degree of hardship.
24. For an example of this argument, see Raisor v. Educ. Loan Serv. Ctr. (In re
Raisor), 180 B.R. 163, 166 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1995).
25. Id.
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I. Discharge of Debt in Bankruptcy
A. General Discharge and the Nondischargeability of Student Debt
1. Overview of Bankruptcy Discharge
Bankruptcy discharge provisions, which release debtors from lia-
bility for many pre-bankruptcy debts, are the main form of debtor re-
lief provided for in bankruptcy law.2 6 In the House Report
accompanying the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Congress de-
scribed discharge as "the heart of the fresh start provisions of the
bankruptcy law."27 The courts have generally agreed that discharge is
the "cornerstone" of a debtor's economic recovery; "the discharge
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code offer the foremost remedy to effec-
tuate the 'fresh start' which is the goal of bankruptcy relief to the
debtor."28 In 1934, the Supreme Court noted that one of the primary
purposes of bankruptcy legislation is "to relieve the honest debtor
from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start
afresh free from the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon
business misfortunes. '29
Although the law is designed to facilitate debtors' economic reha-
bilitation by providing a fresh financial start,30 the law's partiality to-
ward providing a clean slate is not designed to shield a debtor from
educational loan repayment except in extreme circumstances.3 In
fact, section 523(a) (8) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a bank-
ruptcy discharge does not release a debtor from any debt for an edu-
cational loan insured or guaranteed by the government or a non-
profit institution.3 2 Accordingly, student loan debt subject to section
26. Susan Jensen-Conklin, Nondischargeable Debts in Chapter 13: "Fresh Start" or "Haven
for Criminals"?, 7 BANKR. DEv. J. 517, 519 (1990).
27. H.R. REP. No. 95-596, at 384 (1977).
28. Jensen-Conklin, supra note 26, at 519.
29. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (quoting Williams v. U.S. Fidel-
ity & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915)).
30. Nat'l Bank of N. Am. v. Newmark (In re Newmark), 20 B.R. 842, 852 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1982); see also 1 COLLIER BANKRUPTCY MANUAL 1.03[2] [d] [iv] (Alan N. Resnick
& Henry J. Sommer eds., 15th ed., rev. 2007) (noting that the discharge in Chapter 7
"enables the honest debtor to begin a new financial life").
31. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2000).
32. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) states:
(a) A discharge under [Chapters 7 or 13] of this title does not discharge an indi-
vidual debtor from any debt-
(8) for an educational benefit overpayment or loan made, insured or guaranteed
by a governmental unit, or made under any program funded in whole or in part
[Vol. 42
NONDISCHARGEABILITY OF STUDENT LOANS
523(a) (8) passes through bankruptcy unchanged, leaving the debtor
responsible for loan repayment despite bankruptcy proceedings. 33
2. Policy Behind the Nondischargeability of Student Debt
The policy behind section 523(a) (8) is clear. First enacted in
1978 to replace a repealed provision of the Educational Code, 34 sec-
tion 523(a) (8) addresses a growing abuse in the bankruptcy system.35
As explained by the Second Circuit, educational debts are unsecured,
and students have few assets upon graduation, so debtors have an in-
centive to discharge student loans in bankruptcy. 36 Upon discharge,
debtors would "enjoy the higher earning power the loans have made
possible without the financial burden that repayment entails."37 The
Second Circuit also noted that the government, when guaranteeing
student loans, is unable to act as would an ordinary commercial
lender, who may deny loans to individuals with poor credit or adjust
the interest rate to reflect likelihood of repayment.3 8 Instead, the gov-
ernment must offer low fixed-rate loans based on student need, re-
gardless of credit-risk. 39 When Congress enacted section 523(a) (8),
such abuses were threatening the viability of educational loan pro-
grams, endangering future student loans, and harming taxpayers. 40
"Congress recognized that this was a case in which a creditor's interest
by a governmental unit or nonprofit institution, or for an obligation to repay
funds received as an educational benefit, scholarship or stipend ....
Id.
33. 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a) (8), 727, 1328(a) (2); Kielisch v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In
re Kielisch), 258 F.3d 315, 320 (4th Cir. 2001). After a bankruptcy court grants discharge, a
"debtor remains personally responsible for all ...nondischargeable debts." Ekenasi v.
Educ. Res. Inst. (In re Ekenasi), 325 F.3d 541, 545 (4th Cir. 2003).
34. Cazenovia Coll. v. Renshaw (In re Renshaw), 222 F.3d 82, 87 (2d Cir. 2000). Con-
gress initially appointed the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, an
independent group of judges and private citizens, to evaluate the bankruptcy system and
make suggestions for reform. See COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R.
Doc. No. 93-137, pt. 1, at 11, 170, 176-77 (1973).
35. Renshaw, 222 F.3d at 86-87.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Serv. Corp. (In re Brunner), 46 B.R. 752, 756
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985), affd, 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987).
39. Id.
40. Renshaw, 222 F.3d at 87; see also Nash v. Conn. Student Loan Found. (In re Nash),
446 F.3d 188, 191 (1st Cir. 2006) ("Congress has made the judgment that the general
purpose of the Bankruptcy Code to give honest debtors a fresh start does not automatically
apply to student loan debtors. Rather, the interest in ensuring the continued viability of
the student loan program takes precedence.").
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in receiving full payment of the debt outweighed a debtor's interest in
a fresh start.
41
3. "Undue Hardship" Exception
Based on the express language of section 523(a) (8) and the pol-
icy behind its enactment, the statute makes "student loans a very diffi-
cult burden to shake without actually paying them off."42 In certain
exceptional circumstances, however, a debtor may overcome this bur-
den by proving by a preponderance of the evidence 43 that "excepting
such debt from discharge . . . will impose an undue hardship on the
debtor and the debtor's dependents. ' 44 An undue hardship determi-
nation, if granted, fully discharges a debtor's educational loans if and
when he or she receives a bankruptcy discharge. 45Jurisdictions vary in
interpreting what constitutes hardship sufficient to grant this gener-
ous discharge, but most courts follow the three-part test created by the
Second Circuit in Brunner.4 6
41. Renshaw, 222 F.3d at 87.
42. Brunner, 46 B.R. at 752, 756.
43. Bender v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Bender), 297 B.R. 126, 130 (Bankr. D.
Neb. 2003) affd, 368 F.3d 846 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp.
(In re Long), 271 B.R. 322, 328 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2002) ("The debtor has the burden of
proving undue hardship by a preponderance of the evidence.").
44. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2000). Congress originally included two exceptions to
nondischargeablity of student loans: undue hardship and the seven-year rule. 4 COLLIER ON
BANKRuprcy, supra note 15, 523.14[6]. Prior to October 1998, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (8) (A)
allowed discharge of an educational loan if repayment first became due more than SEvEN
vYARs before the filing date. Id. Congress repealed the seven year rule in 1998. Gallagher v.
Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Gallagher), 333 B.R. 169, 172 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2005).
45. 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(8), 727(a), 1328(a).
46. 831 F.2d 395 (2nd Cir. 1987). The Brunner test was created in the Second Circuit
and is generally followed by the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits. See id.; see also Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Faish (In re Faish),
72 F.3d 298, 300 (3d Cir. 1995); Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Frushour (In re Frushour),
433 F.3d 393, 400 (4th Cir. 2005); U.S. Dep't of Educ. v. Gerhardt (In re Gerhardt), 348
F.3d 89, 91 (5th Cir. 2003); Cheesman v. Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. (In re Cheesman),
25 F.3d 356, 359 (6th Cir. 1994); In re Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132, 1135 (7th Cir. 1993);
United Student Aid Funds v. Pena (In rePena), 155 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 1998); Educ.
Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Polleys, 356 F.3d 1302, 1309 (10th Cir. 2004); Hemar Ins. Corp. of
Am. v. Cox (In re Cox), 338 F.3d 1238, 1241 (11th Cir. 2003). The Sixth Circuit's Cheesman
test parallels the Brunner test. The Cheesman test requires a determination of "(1) [w]hether
the debtors are capable of paying the loan while maintaining a minimal standard of living;
(2) [wjhether the debtor's financial circumstances are likely to persist for a significant
portion of the repayment period; (3) [t]he debtor has made a good faith effort to repay
the loan." Strauss v. Student Loan Office-Mercer Univ. (In re Strauss), 216 B.R. 638, 640-41
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1998) (citing Cheesman, 25 F.3d at 359). The distinction between Chees-
man and Brunner is negligible; less than a year after Strauss was decided, the Ninth Circuit
analyzed the Cheesman and Brunner tests side-by-side and concluded that "[i]t does not
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B. Brunner v. New York State Higher Education Services: The Brunner
Test
1. The Case
Brunner involved a debtor who accumulated $9,000 of educa-
tional debt during the course of her undergraduate and graduate
school education. 4 7 With the help of her student loans, the debtor
received a Bachelor's degree in psychology and a Master's degree in
social work. 48 However, seven months after graduation, the debtor ex-
perienced substantial financial difficulty due to her inability to find
employment as a psychologist and petitioned for Chapter 7 bank-
ruptcy. 49 Upon completing the Chapter 7 proceedings, the debtor re-
ceived a general discharge but remained responsible for repayment of
her educational loans. 50 To eliminate her educational debt, the
debtor filed an adversary proceeding seeking to discharge her student
loans on the basis of undue hardship. 5'
At the time Brunner was decided, few appellate courts had inter-
preted the meaning of undue hardship, 52 and the legislature had not
defined undue hardship in the Bankruptcy Code.5 3 Commenting on
the lack of congressional direction, the Brunner court noted that "the
existence of the adjective 'undue' indicate[d] that Congress viewed
garden-variety hardship as an insufficient excuse for a discharge of
student loans, but the statute otherwise [gave] no hint of the phrase's
intended meaning. ' 54 To assist itself in defining the vague term, the
appear that the Sixth Circuit in Cheesman was proclaiming a test distinct from Brunner."
Pena, 155 F.3d at 1112. The Eighth Circuit follows a totality-of-the-circumstances test, which
requires consideration of (1) the debtor's past, present, and reasonably reliable future
financial resources; (2) the debtor's and her dependents' reasonable necessary living ex-
penses; and (3) any other relevant facts and circumstances surrounding each particular
bankruptcy case. Andrews v. S.D. Student Loan Assistance Corp. (In re Andrews), 661 F.2d
702, 704 (8th Cir. 1981). As both the totality-of-the-circumstances test and Brunner lack a
timing standard, both are subject to the same ripeness debate. See supra note 12. The First
Circuit has not adopted a particular test. Nash v. Conn. Student Loan Found. (In re Nash),
446 F.3d 188, 190 (1st Cir. 2006) ("[T]here has been much attention given to the particu-
lar test which should be applied to determine 'undue hardship.' Congress did not attempt
to give specific guidance. We as a circuit have not had occasion to declare our views.").
47. Brunner, 46 B.R. at 753.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 753 n.] ("The sole authority from the Courts of Appeals appears to be An-
drews ....").
53. Id.
54. Id.
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Brunner court turned to "legislative history and the decisions of other
district and bankruptcy courts," where available.
55
2. The Test
To create its three-part hardship test, the Brunner court first re-
viewed a draft bill proposed by the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws
of the United States ("the Commission"), which cited the "rising inci-
dence of consumer bankruptcies of former students motivated prima-
rily to avoid payment of educational loan debts" as the reason for the
Code provision. 56 In its recommendation to Congress, the Commis-
sion stated that hardship was "undue" if the "amount and reliability of
income and other wealth which the debtor could reasonably be ex-
pected to receive in the future could [not] maintain the debtor and
his or her dependents at a minimal standard of living as well as pay off
the student loans."'57 From the Commission's statement, the Brunner
court created the first element of its three-part test: "before receiving
a discharge of student loans the debtor is required to demonstrate
that, given his or her current income and expenses, the necessity of
making the monthly loan payment will cause his or her standard of
living to fall below a 'minimal' level."58 This element has been coined
the "minimal standard of living" test.59
The Brunner court then looked to trial courts to determine how
they had interpreted undue hardship and found that most courts re-
quired the Commission's "minimal standard of living" test plus an ad-
ditional showing of hardship.60 In order to demonstrate this
additional hardship, a debtor was generally required to show "unique"
or "exceptional" circumstances, such as illness, lack of usable job
skills, or a large number of dependents. 61 Quoting Judge Lifland of
the Bankruptcy Court in the Southern District of New York, the Brun-
ner court emphasized that the "dischargeability of student loans
should be based upon the certainty of hopelessness, not simply a pre-
sent inability to fulfill financial commitment. '62 Thus, the Brunner
55. Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Serv. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir. 1987),
affg46 B.R. 752 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
56. Brunner, 46 B.R. at 754 (quoting the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the
United States' 1973 report, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt. 1, at 140 n.14).
57. Id. at 754.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 754-55.
61. Id. at 755.
62. Id.
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court incorporated this concept into the second element of its three-
part test: the debtor must demonstrate that the "current inability to
pay will extend for a significant portion of the repayment period of
the loan.
' 63
Lastly, the Brunner court evaluated case law, the Commission re-
port, and congressional intent to add a requirement of good faith to
its hardship analysis. 64 Trial courts had required such a showing in the
past,65 and the Brunner court found authority for this requirement in a
recommendation the Commission prepared. 66 Specifically, the Com-
mission advised Congress to allow full discharge of student debts with-
out a showing of undue hardship after five years if the debt remained
outstanding due to "factors beyond [the debtor's] reasonable con-
trol. '6 7 The Brunner court interpreted this language as obligating debt-
ors to attempt, in good faith, to make payments on their educational
debt in order to receive a discharge. 68 The Brunner court also read a
good-faith requirement into the stated purpose of section 523(a) (8):
to keep students with large educational debts from taking advantage
of the bankruptcy system.69 Based on these authorities, the Brunner
court added a third element to its definition of undue hardship: the
debtor must have made a good-faith effort to repay the loans prior to
seeking discharge. 70
Applying its test to the debtor, the Brunner court held that she did
not meet her burden of proof on the second and third elements of
the test. 71 While the court agreed that she was unable to simultane-
ously meet her minimal expenses and pay off her loans, the court held
63. Id.
64. Id. at 755-56.
65. Id. at 755.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. (citing Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Johnson (In reJohnson), No. 77-
2033 TI, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11428, at *41 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. June 27, 1979).
Even where a court finds that repayment of the educational debt would impose
"undue hardship" on the student debtor, discharge should not be granted if the
debtor has not made a bona fide attempt to repay the loan: "Should the debtor's
expected financial condition qualify him for a hardship discharge, such discharge
nevertheless ought to be denied during the five-year period if the debtor has not
made a good faith effort to obtain income or assets sufficient to repay the educa-
tional debt."
Johnson, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11428, at *41 (quoting A. Ahart, Discharging Student Loans in
Bankruptcy, 52 AM. BANKR. L.J. 201, 207 (1978)).
69. Brunner, 46 B.R. at 755.
70. Id. at 756.
71. Id. at 757.
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that the debtor did not prove that her current inability to find work
would extend for a significant period of loan repayment. 72 The
debtor's good health, apparent intellect, and lack of dependents sup-
ported the court's position. 73 In addition, the court held that the
debtor did not demonstrate a good faith attempt to repay the loans, as
she filed her petition for bankruptcy within a month of receiving her
first repayment bill.74 The district court declared the debtor's loans
nondischargeable, 75 and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed. 76
II. Hardship Tests as Applied to Chapter 13 Debtor
A. The Problem in Applying the Brunner Test to Chapter 13 Cases
A majority of courts use Brunner to evaluate debtors' degree of
hardship, and do so in all dischargeability proceedings involving stu-
dent debt, regardless of the chapter. 77 The broad application of Brun-
ner, however, has proven problematic with respect to Chapter 13 cases.
Because the "Brunner elements do not transfer neatly to an adversary
proceeding brought to discharge student loan obligations in the midst
of the debtor's attempts to comply with a confirmed Chapter 13
plan," 78 courts are divided as to whether the Brunner elements must be
applied at the time of general bankruptcy discharge, or at any time
after a debtor files a bankruptcy petition. 79 The root of the debate lies
in the difference between a Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 discharge.
Chapter 7, commonly referred to as a "straight bankruptcy,"80
provides debtor relief through a court-supervised collection, liquida-
tion, and distribution of a debtor's nonexempt property l for the ben-
72. Id. at 758.
73. Id. at 757.
74. Id. at 758.
75. Id.
76. Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir. 1987),
affg46 B.R. 752 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
77. Brunner, 46 B.R. at 756. Nine Circuits follow Brunner. See supra note 46.
78. Ekenasi v. Educ. Res. Inst. (In re Ekenasi), 325 F.3d 541, 546 (4th Cir. 2003).
79. See supra notes 18 and 19 and accompanying text.
80. 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 15, 1 700.01.
81. The bankruptcy estate broadly consists of all of the debtor's legal and equitable
interests in property, wherever located and by whomever held, as of the commencement of
the case. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2000). However, several enumerated types of property are
excluded from the bankruptcy estate, including funds placed in particular types of educa-
tional savings accounts, and wages paid into specific types of employee-benefit plans, de-
ferred-compensation plans, and tax-deferred annuities. Id. § 541 (b) (5)-(7).
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efit of creditors. 82 In exchange for surrendering property for
liquidation, a Chapter 7 debtor receives a discharge of all pre-bank-
ruptcy debts that are not excepted from discharge,8 3 even if the value
of the debtor's assets are insufficient to pay all, or even some, of the
debtor's outstanding indebtedness. 84 In most Chapter 7 cases, the
court will grant discharge soon after the debtor petitions for relief,
sometimes before creditors receive a single payment from the debtor's
bankruptcy estate and usually before the case is closed.85 Discharge in
Chapter 7 is rapid because it is dependent on the mere filing of a
Chapter 7 petition, rather than on completion of a repayment plan.
86
In contrast, a central purpose of Chapter 13 is to enable a debtor
to retain certain assets that would otherwise be liquidated and distrib-
uted in Chapter 7.87 In order to retain his or her property, a Chapter
13 debtor is required to develop and execute an individualized repay-
ment plan to satisfy some or all of his or her creditors' claims. 88 Al-
though a debtor is permitted great flexibility in developing a Chapter
13 plan,89 once the plan is confirmed, the debtor must commit all
disposable future income to the plan for its duration, which may last
up to five years. 90 Only upon full compliance with the Chapter 13 plan
will a debtor receive discharge of unpaid debts that are not excepted
82. See generally I COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 15.
83. 11 U.S.C. §§ 523, 727(b). In addition to student loans, section 523 lists other types
of debts that are non-dischargeable even after the debtor has received a discharge, includ-
ing debts for alimony and child support. Id. § 523.
84. 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 15, 1.03[2] [d] [iv].
85. Id. ("What nonexempt property the debtor has will be converted to proceeds by
the trustee and paid to creditors but, if there is no or little property, creditors may receive
nothing.... [T]he honest debtor is entitled to the discharge so that unpaid creditors may
not thereafter bring suit against the debtor to recover any part of the debt from any prop-
erty the debtor acquires after the filing of the chapter 7 petition.").
86. 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 15, 727.01[1]. "Section 727 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code provides that the court must grant a discharge to a chapter 7 debtor unless
one or more of the specific grounds for denial of a discharge enumerated in paragraphs
(1) through (12) of section 72 7 (a) is proven to exist." Id. (emphasis added). Subject to
several exceptions, "the [Chapter 7] discharge is to be granted by the court 'forthwith' on
expiration of the time fixed for filing a complaint objecting to discharge and the time
fixed for filing a motion to dismiss the case .... . Id. at 727.01 [2]; cf 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)
(providing that in Chapter 13 cases, "as soon as practicable after completion by the debtor of all
payments under the plan.., the court shall grant the debtor a discharge of all debts provided
for by the plan or disallowed," subject to enumerated exceptions). Id. (emphasis added).
87. 11 U.S.C. § 1306(b) ("Except as provided in a confirmed plan or order confirm-
ing a plan, the debtor shall remain in possession of all property of the estate.").
88. Id. §§ 1322, 1325.
89. See generally id. § 1322(b)(11).
90. Id. § 1322(d).
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from discharge. 9' Unlike Chapter 7 discharge, therefore, a Chapter 13
discharge is significantly delayed due to the length and necessity of a
Chapter 13 repayment plan.9 2
In Brunner, the debtor petitioned under Chapter 7 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code.93 The Brunner court appropriately confined its analysis
to the case before the court and crafted its test to resolve the hardship
question for a Chapter 7 debtor.9 4 In addition, the Brunner test was
created at a time when student loans were excepted from discharge in
Chapter 7 cases only; Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code five
years after Brunner, expressly extending the nondischargeability of stu-
dent loan provisions to Chapter 13 debtors.9 5 Noting this fact, the
Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of New York stated that "it
is unclear, therefore, exactly how the Second Circuit would intend
that its Brunner test should be applied in a Chapter 13 case."96
Given that the Brunner debtor petitioned under Chapter 7 at a
time when student loans were not excepted from discharge in Chap-
ter 13 cases, the language of the resulting test understandably fails to
specify whether each element applies at the time of discharge or at
any time after a debtor files a bankruptcy petition. This uncertainty
has created problems for Chapter 13 debtors seeking a dis-
chargeability determination prior to completing repayment plans.
Some courts interpret Brunner as applying to the time of a debtor's
discharge, that is, at the time a debtor completes a Chapter 13 repay-
ment plan.97 Other courts view Brunner as applicable at the time a
debtor seeks a dischargeability determination, regardless of when the
debtor will actually receive his or her discharge. 98 When presented
with this ambiguity, courts have sought direction from the legislative
intent behind Chapters 7 and 13.99
91. Id. §§ 523, 1328(a); see also zd. § 1307(a) (providing that if a Chapter 13 plan is not
successfully completed, the case may be converted to Chapter 7 or dismissed).
92. See id. § 1328 ("As soon as practicable after completion by the debtor of all pay-
ments under the plan... court shall grant the debtor a discharge of all debts provided for
by the plan.").
93. "[Tlhe Brunner factors . . . were developed in the context of an adversary pro-
ceeding brought to discharge student loan obligations at the conclusion of a Chapter 7
proceeding." Ekenasi v. Educ. Res. Inst. (In re Ekenasi), 325 F.3d 541, 546 (4th Cir. 2003).
94. Id. (noting that the Brunner test does not transfer easily to Chapter 13 cases).
95. Goranson v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In reGoranson), 183 B.R. 52, 54
(Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 1995).
96. Id. at 54.
97. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
99. See infra Part II.B.
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B. Congressional Intent
In drafting current Chapter 13 legislation, 100 Congress sought to
encourage overextended income-earning debtors to choose Chapter
13 over Chapter 7.101 Acknowledging that prior "wage earner plan"
legislation had deterred debtors from choosing repayment plans over
liquidation proceedings, 10 2 Congress made several legislative changes
designed to benefit debtors who file under Chapter 13.103 For exam-
ple, Congress simplified and eliminated several rules regarding repay-
ment plans, allowed for substantial flexibility in the plans, placed
statutory limits on the length of time of repayment plans, and made
Chapter 13 discharge more generous than Chapter 7 discharge. 10 4 In
addition, Congress gave student debtors an extremely powerful incen-
tive to choose Chapter 13 over Chapter 7 when it first enacted Chap-
ter 13: prior to 1990, the discharge exception of section 523(a) (8) did
not apply to Chapter 13 debtors-this statutory scheme guaranteed
the discharge of unpaid student debt upon completion of a confirmed
Chapter 13 plan even if the debtor was capable of repaying the
debt.1 0 5 Since student loans were only exempted from discharge in
Chapter 7, the legislation "had the effect of providing debtors with an
incentive to file Chapter 13 plans and discharge their student loan
100. Congress enacted Chapter 13 in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. 11 U.S.C.
§§ 101-1330 (2000).
101. "[T]he use of bankruptcy law should be a last resort ... if it is used, debtors
should attempt repayment under chapter 13." H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 117 (1977).
102. "[A]n overly stringent and formalized Chapter XIII (wage earner plans) has dis-
couraged overextended debtors from attempting to arrange a repayment plan under
which all creditors are repaid most, if not all, of their claims over an extended period." Id.
at 117-18.
103. The legislative intent of [C]hapter 13 is... no mystery. In the words of the
Committee on the judiciary of the House of Representatives: [t] his bill attempts to
cure [the inadequacies of Chapter XIII of the former Bankruptcy Act] and to
prevent the frequent problems confronting consumer debtors that have occurred
both in the bankruptcy court and out.
8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 15, 1300.02 (quoting H.R. REt. No. 95-595, at 117
(1977)).
104. 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 15, 1300.02; see also Goranson v. Pa.
Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Goranson), 183 B.R. 52, 55 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 1995).
105. 2 COLLIER BANKRUPTCY MANUAL, supra note 30, 523.13[2].
Originally, the nondischargeability of student loans applied only to Chapter 7
bankruptcies, which had the effect of providing debtors with an incentive to file
Chapter 13 plans and discharge their student loan debts at the conclusion of the
plan payments without a showing of undue hardship. Congress eliminated this
incentive when it amended the statute in 1990 to extend the non-dischargeability
of student loans to Chapter 13 filings.
Ekenasi v. Educ. Res. Inst. (In re Ekanasi), 325 F.3d 541, 546 (4th Cir. 2003) (citations
omitted).
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debts at the conclusion of the plan payments without a showing of
undue hardship."'10 6
Congress eliminated the student loan discharge incentive in the
1990 amendments by excepting student loans from discharge in
Chapter 13 cases.' 0 7 Yet the 1990 amendments did not wholly elimi-
nate a student debtor's incentive to file under Chapter 13. For exam-
ple, Chapter 13 discharge continues to release the debtor from
liability for more types of debt than the discharge available in Chapter
7,108 and Chapter 13 debtors are still permitted to retain present assets
while financing payment plans with future income. 10 9 More impor-
tantly, Congress has enacted little legislation beyond the 1990 amend-
ments to discourage debtors from choosing Chapter 13.110 Most
notably, Congress did not restrict when a Chapter 13 debtor may seek
an undue hardship discharge determination under section
523(a) (8). 111 Since a time restriction regarding the filing of a dis-
chargeability action is "notably absent from the Bankruptcy Code,
106. Ekenasi, 325 F.3d at 546 n.2 (citing Kielisch v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re
Kielisch), 258 F.3d 315, 320 (4th Cir. 2001)).
107. Id.
108. "Certain debts discharged in Chapter 13 are nodischargeable in Chapter 7;
[d]ebts dischargeable in a Chapter 13 case include debts for some willful and malicious
torts, fines and penalties [ ], marital property settlement debts, and debts as to which a
discharge was denied in an earlier bankruptcy case." 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note
15, 1328.02[2] [a]. As the Bankruptcy Code states:
(a) As soon as practicable after completion by the debtor of all payments under
the plan, unless the court approves a written waiver of discharge executed by the
debtor after the order for relief under this chapter, the court shall grant the
debtor a discharge of all debts provided for by the plan or disallowed under sec-
tion 502 of this title, except any debt-
(1) provided for under section 1322(b) (5) of this title;
(2) of the kind specified in paragraph (5), (8) , or (9) of this title;
or (3) for restitution of a criminal fine ....
11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (2000).
109. See id. § 1306(b) ("Except as provided in a confirmed plan or order confirming a
plan, the debtor shall remain in possession of all property of the estate.").
110. Although Congress has discouraged Chapter 13 filings by narrowing the scope of
the Chapter 13 discharge in the 1990, 1994, and 2005 amendments, Chapter 13 discharge
remains more generous to debtors than Chapter 7 discharge. See 8 COLLIER ON BANK-
RUPTCY, supra note 15, 1328.02[2] [a].
111. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2000). As one court stated:
[W]e decline to adopt a hard and fast rule which would preclude bankruptcy
courts from even entertaining a proceeding to discharge student loan obligations
until at or near the time the debtor has completed payments under a confirmed
Chapter 13 plan. The text of pertinent statutes does not prohibit such an advance
determination.
Ekanasi, 325 F. 3d at 547; see also Strahm v. Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp. (In re Strahm),
327 B.R. 319, 322 (S.D. Ohio 2005).
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Bankruptcy Rules or other statutes,"'112 Congress did not likely intend
the hardship exception, or any other legislation, to deter debtors from
filing under Chapter 13.
III. Evaluation of the Ripeness Issue Raised by Brunner in
Chapter 13 Cases
Although Congress enacted legislation to encourage debtors to
choose Chapter 13 over Chapter 7, the Brunner test's lack of timing
language appears to hinder this congressional goal by introducing the
issue of ripeness into Chapter 13 hardship analyses. Each element of
the Brunner test may be interpreted as allowing for a hardship deter-
mination at any time, or, alternatively, limiting a hardship analysis un-
til a debtor's repayment plan is complete.1 13 Because there is no
statutory language resolving this question, it seems that Congress
neither anticipated ripeness as a consideration in the hardship analy-
sis 1 14 nor predicted that a debtor pleading the hardship exception
would be prevented from doing so based on choosing Chapter 13.115
If the Brunner test remains unchanged, the ripeness issue may moti-
vate debtors to petition for Chapter 7 rather than Chapter 13, thus
defeating an important congressional goal of encouraging Chapter 13
over Chapter 7.116
A. The Ripeness Doctrine
Ripeness is an independent requirement for judicial review,1 17
which dictates whether the reviewing court can, and should, entertain
disputes.1 1 "The ripeness doctrine is invoked to determine whether a
dispute has developed to a point that warrants decision," 119 and is typi-
cally regarded as an equitable doctrine1 20 that prevents judicial review
112. Strahm, 327 B.R. at 320.
113. See infra Part III.B.
114. See supra Part II.B.
115. See supra Part II.B; see, e.g., Raisor v. Educ. Loan Serv. Ctr. (In re Raisor), 180 B.R.
163, 167 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1995) ("[I]t is premature for the Court to determine whether
or not the PLUS Loans will cause undue hardship if the loans are not discharged. Under
Chapter 13, the appropriate time for this determination is near or at the time the plan is
scheduled for completion.").
116. See supra Part II.B.
117. Burlington N.R.R. Co. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 75 F.3d 685, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
118. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967).
119. Auto., Petroleum & Allied Indus. Employees Union, Local 618 v. Gelco Corp., 758
F.2d 1272, 1275 (8th Cir. 1985).
120. Cincinnati Sch. Dist. v. Bd. of Educ., 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 22497, at *7 (6th Cir.
2005).
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of hypothetical or speculative disagreements.1 2 ' As expressed by the
United States Supreme Court, "[The] basic rationale [of the ripeness
doctrine] is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature
adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagree-
ments."122
Before adjudicating a complaint, a court must conclude that the
case is ripe for review, triggering an analysis of both constitutional and
prudential ripeness. 23 Because ripeness is a two-part inquiry, a debtor
seeking a discharge determination must prevail on both parts in order
for the court to consider the complaint ripe.' 24 While courts generally
agree that constitutional ripeness is satisfied upon filing either a
Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 action, 125 Chapter 13 debtors often find pru-
dential ripeness very hard to satisfy. 126
1. Constitutional Ripeness
To satisfy the first element of ripeness, a debtor must demon-
strate "sufficient injury to meet Article III's requirement of a case or
controversy." 127 Under Article III of the United States Constitution,
the jurisdiction of federal courts is limited to actual cases or contro-
versies. 128 This jurisdictional limitation, known as a justiciability re-
quirement, generally prevents courts from entertaining hypothetical
or abstract issues; however, "j] usticiability is itself a concept of uncer-
121. Neb. Pub. Power Dist. v. MidAmerican Energy Co., 234 F.3d 1032, 1038 (8th Cir.
2000).
122. Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 148.
123. As the Eleventh Circuit states, "[t]he ripeness doctrine involves both jurisdictional
limitations imposed by Article III's . . . case [or] controversy [clause] and prudential con-
siderations arising from problems of prematurity and abstractness that may present insur-
mountable obstacles to the exercise of the court's jurisdiction, even though jurisdiction is
technically present." Johnson v. Sikes, 730 F.2d 644, 648 (11th Cir.1984); see also MidAmeri-
can Energy Co., 234 F.3d at 1038.
124. Ripeness "is best seen in a twofold aspect, requiring us to evaluate both the fitness
of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court
consideration." Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 149.
125. See Coleman v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Coleman), 333 B.R. 841, 847-48
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2005) (stating that "the issue of dischargeability of a student loan
presents a 'case and controversy' from the constitutional standpoint as soon as the Chapter
13 case is filed"); see also Craine v. United States (In re Craine), 206 B.R. 598 (Bankr. D. Fla.
1997).
126. See infra Part III.A.2.
127. Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1524 (11th Cir. 1995); see also U.S. CONST. art. III,
§ 2.
128. See U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2; see also S. Jackson & Son, Inc. v. Coffee, Sugar & Cocoa
Exch., 24 F.3d 427, 431 (2d Cir. 1994).
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tain meaning and scope." 129 Justiciability is not "a legal concept with a
fixed content or susceptible of scientific verification,"130 and conse-
quently the Court has defined it by what is not justiciable.13 ' Among
nonjusticiable controversies are political questions, requests for advi-
sory opinions, issues that have been mooted by subsequent events, and
issues presented by parties without standing.1 32 Similarly, an issue
brought before a party is harmed fails to present the requisite case or
controversy and must be dismissed for lack of ripeness.1 33
Constitutional ripeness is rarely raised in opposition to a dis-
chargeability action, and no court has cited it as adequate grounds for
dismissal.' 34 In fact, only three courts have addressed ripeness from a
constitutional standpoint in the bankruptcy context.1 35 In Bender v.
Educational Credit Management Corp.,' 36 the court acknowledged the
constitutional requirement of ripeness, but dismissed the debtor's
complaint without addressing the issue due to the debtor's failure to
satisfy prudential ripeness.13 7 In Coleman v. Educational Credit Manage-
ment Corp.,' 38 the bankruptcy court addressed ripeness from a consti-
tutional position and held that the debtor's dischargeability action
satisfied Article III ripeness.' 3 9 In its analysis, the Coleman court agreed
with the court in Craine v. United States (In re Craine),'40 which found
that "the issue of the dischargeability of a student loan presents a 'case
and controversy' from a constitutional standpoint as soon as the Chap-
ter 13 case is filed."'14 ' The court in Strahm v. Great Lakes Higher Educ.
Corp. (In re Strahm)142 also noted that parties did "not employ the term
'ripe' in a jurisdictional sense, but, rather, in a 'timing' [or pruden-
129. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968).
130. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 508 (1961).
131. Hast, 392 U.S. at 95.
132. Id.
133. Poe, 367 U.S. at 508.
134. Coleman v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Coleman), 333 B.R. 841, 846 (Bankr.
N.D. Cal. 2005).
135. See Coleman, 333 B.R. at 841; Bender v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Bender),
368 F.3d 846, 847 (8th Cir. 2004), affg 297 B.R. 126 (D. Neb. 2003); Craine v. United States
(In re Craine), 206 B.R. 598 (Bankr. D. Fla. 1997).
136. 368 F.3d 846 (8th Cir. 2004).
137. Coleman, 333 B.R. at 846 (citing Bender, 368 F.3d at 847-48).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 847. In denying the lender's motion to dismiss the debtor's dischargeability
action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Coleman court concluded "that it ha[d]
subject matter jurisdiction to determine whether a student loan debt should be discharged
as an undue hardship prior to the completion of a chapter 13 debtor's plan payments." Id.
140. 206 B.R. 598.
141. Coleman, 333 B.R. at 846-47.
142. 327 B.R. 319.
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tial] sense. 1 4 3 Based on the absence of additional case law addressing
Article III ripeness, courts appear to agree that the requisite case or
controversy exists at the filing of hardship actions.
2. Prudential Ripeness
The second inquiry in the ripeness analysis involves policy consid-
erations. 144 A debtor must show, and the court must conclude, that
"the claim is sufficiently mature, and the issues sufficiently defined
and concrete, to permit effective decision-making by the court."'14 5
This element is often considered sub-constitutional or prudential, and
"concerns the wisdom of having the court adjudicate the matter in
question."'1 46 Ripeness in the prudential sense often calls for an analy-
sis of "policy factors such as political concerns, separation of powers,
and over-encroachment on the rights of the states.' '1 47
In contrast to the constitutional inquiry, the prudential aspect of
ripeness has been the basis of many dismissals of Chapter 13 dis-
chargeability actions, and the issue continues to divide courts. 1 48 In
the prudential analysis, courts are divided over when to apply the
Brunner test: at the time of the dischargeability action, or at the time
of general bankruptcy discharge. 149 Courts have analyzed the Brunner
elements in both ways; some find the Brunner language mandates that
courts apply the test at the time of the dischargeability action, regard-
less of when the action is filed. 150 Others apply the test only at the
time of discharge, and consequently dismiss dischargeability actions
brought before discharge for lack of ripeness.15 1Thus, courts analyz-
ing the specific language of Brunner have arrived at different conclu-
sions on the issue of prudential ripeness.
143. Id. at 321.
144. Bender v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Bender), 297 B.R. 126, 132 (Bankr. D.
Neb. 2003), affd, 368 F.3d 846 (8th Cir. 2004).
145. Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1524 (11th Cir. 1995).
146. Id.; see also Adult Video Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 71 F.3d 563, 567 (6th Cir.
1995).
147. 15 JAMES WM. MooRE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 101.01 (3d ed. 1999).
148. See infra Part III.B.
149. See infra Part III.B.
150. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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B. Applying the Brunner Test in Chapter 13 Cases Creates
Inequitable and Inconsistent Results
1. Element 1: The Debtor Cannot Maintain a Minimal Standard of
Living
To satisfy the first element of the Brunner test, a debtor must
demonstrate that he or she cannot maintain, based on current in-
come and expenses, a minimal standard of living if forced to repay the
loans. 152 In Chapter 7 cases, this element is simple in application as
"current" income typically coincides with income at or near the time
of discharge. 153 Yet in Chapter 13 cases, courts have defined "current"
income as either income at the time of discharge or income at the
time of the dischargeability action. 154
Many courts interpret the phrase "current income" to mean the
debtor's income at the time of discharge. 155 In Pair v. United States
Department of Educationt 56 and Raisor v. Education Loan Servicing
Center,157 the courts assumed that the "minimal standard of living" test
applied to the debtor at the time of discharge and dismissed the debt-
ors' dischargeability actions, reasoning that "it is impossible to deter-
mine whether a Chapter 13 debtor will be able to maintain a minimal
standard of living after receiving discharge."1 58 The Raisor court fur-
ther concluded that "it is speculative at this time what the [d]ebtor's
income and expenses will be at the time the [p]lan is scheduled for
completion. It is possible that the [d]ebtor's income may increase
during the life of the [p]lan and negate the need for the discharge of
the [student] [1]oans."1 59 To avoid speculation as to a debtor's "cur-
rent income" at the time of discharge, courts adopting this view dis-
miss complaints as premature unless filed near or at the time of
discharge.1 60 However, dismissing dischargeability actions as prema-
ture penalizes debtors who choose Chapter 13 over Chapter 7, disad-
152. Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Serv. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir. 1987),
affg 46 B.R. 752 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
153. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
154. See tnfra Part III.C.
155. Pair v. U.S. Dep't of Educ. (In rePair), 269 B.R. 719, 720 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2001);
Raisor v. Educ. Loan Servicing Ctr. (In re Raisor), 180 B.R. 163, 166 (Bankr. E.D. Tex.
1995); Rubarts v. First Gibraltar Bank (In re Rubarts), 896 F.2d 107, 109 (5th Cir. 1990).
156. 269 B.R. 719 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2001).
157. 180 B.R. 163 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1995).
158. Pair, 269 B.R. at 720 (citing Raisar, 180 B.R. at 166).
159. Raisor, 180 B.R. at 166.
160. See, e.g, Soler v. United States (In re Soler), 250 B.R. 694, 697 (Bankr. D. Minn.
2000); Razsor, 180 B.R. at 166; Rubarts, 896 F.2d at 109.
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vantages those Chapter 13 debtors who file bankruptcy petitions in
jurisdictions that view "current income" as that at the time of dis-
charge, and deprives courts of the ability to determine dis-
chargeability actions on their merits, thus removing the judicial
discretion inherent in section 523(a) (8).
In assessing the meaning of "current income," other courts con-
clude that the phrase refers to the debtor's income at the time of the
dischargeability action, not at the time of discharge. 16' The court in
Coleman noted that courts interpreting the "issue as whether undue
hardship exists at the time of discharge" are merely adding 'judicial
gloss to [section] 523(a) (8)."162 "The issue defined by the statute does
not include the [words 'at the time of discharge']. There is no express
statutory prohibition on determining this issue before the discharge is
granted. 1 63 Courts adopting this view allow a "debtor to choose the
'snapshot' date for determining undue hardship on the grounds that
the 'text of the pertinent statute does not prohibit such an advance
determination. ' ,,64 By reading "current income" literally, these courts
effectively eliminate any speculation or uncertainty regarding a
debtor's income; a court may determine, with absolute certainty, the
debtor's income at the time of the dischargeability hearing without
speculating as to the debtor's projected income at discharge. In Goran-
son v. Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency, 165 the court rec-
ognized that applying the Brunner test to the debtor's chosen "snap
161. Coleman v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Coleman), 333 B.R. 841, 846 (Bankr.
N.D. Cal. 2005). The Coleman court noted that the two published decisions from Ninth
Circuit bankruptcy courts had looked at evidence of the debtor's current income as that at
the time of trial. Id. at 848. "This is consistent with the language of the first prong, which
requires a court, when applying the test, to consider 'current income and expense."' Id.
(citing Cota v. U.S. Dep't of Educ. (In re Cota), 298 B.R. 408, 414-15 (Bankr. D. Ariz.
2003); Ritchie v. Northwest Educ. Loan Ass'n (In re Ritchie), 254 B.R. 913, 918 (Bankr. D.
Idaho 2000)); see also Goranson v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Goranson),
183 B.R. 52, 55 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1995). The Goranson court rejected the lender's request
that the court analyze the debtor's income at the conclusion of the Chapter 13 plan. Goran-
son, 183 B.R. at 55. The lender claimed that "because the debtors were capable of making
their monthly payments under their Chapter 13 plan, they must be able to contribute that
same amount each month toward the student loan once their obligation to make plan
payments terminated." Id. The court noted, however, that such analysis would "suggest that
a Chapter 13 debtor who is successfully completing such a plan could never meet the first
prong of the Brunner test, and therefore could never have a student loan discharged." Id.
162. Coleman, 333 B.R. at 845.
163. Id. at 849.
164. Ekenasi v. Educ. Res. Inst. (In re Ekenasi), 325 F.3d 541, 547 (4th Cir. 2003).
165. 183 B.R. 52 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1995).
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shot" date would be challenging, but "[t]o do otherwise would be to
penalize a debtor for electing Chapter 13 over Chapter 7."166
Although the latter view appears more equitable and seems to
further congressional goals, not all debtors enjoy this treatment. In
fact, courts' disagreement over the timing of "current income" illus-
trates Brunner's inability to consistently and equitably define undue
hardship in Chapter 13 cases. In Chapter 7 cases, the first Brunner
element is applied evenly, regardless of how the court views "current
income," because the timing of discharge and the timing of a dis-
chargeability action typically coincide. These events, however, do not
occur simultaneously in Chapter 13 cases, causing courts to apply
Brunner's first element unevenly and inconsistently.
While some courts adopt a view that more closely follows congres-
sional intent to encourage Chapter 13 filings over Chapter 7 filings,
the inconsistency in interpretation should be eliminated by adding
timing language to the Brunner test: courts should entertain hardship
determinations at the time of filing, and reserve jurisdiction to vacate
such determination if circumstances demonstrate that a Chapter 13
debtor, upon completing the repayment plan, can repay the loans
without undue hardship.
2. Element 2: The State of Affairs is Likely to Persist for Much of
the Repayment Period
Courts have also debated the second Brunner element in Chapter
13 cases. Once a debtor proves that he or she cannot maintain a mini-
mal standard of living if required to repay student loans, a debtor
must then prove that the state of affairs is likely to persist for a signifi-
cant portion of the student loan repayment period. 167
Some courts find a Chapter 13 debtor's dischargeability action
premature if filed prior to discharge because a debtor's ability to re-
pay student loans may improve after he or she is relieved of discharge-
able debts. 168 In support of this view, the court in Pair stated that
Brunner's second element must be considered at the time of a debtor's
discharge, so a dischargeability action filed prior to discharge would
impermissibly force the court to speculate as to the debtor's financial
health at the time of discharge. 169 The Raisor court agreed, finding
166. Id. at 56.
167. Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Serv. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir. 1987),
affg 46 B.R. 752 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
168. Pair v. U.S. Dep't of Educ. (In re Pair), 269 B.R. 719, 720 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2001).
169. Id.
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that "because other unsecured debts will be discharged after comple-
tion of the [p]lan, the elimination of these debts could facilitate the
[d]ebtors' abilities to repay the [student] [l]oans."' 170
Other courts, however, have presented persuasive arguments op-
posing this view. These courts have recognized that "[u]nless the re-
payment period is close to completion at the time a Chapter 13
discharge is due, the second prong of the Brunner test always requires
the court to speculate as to the debtor's future financial prospects.' 171
Since student loan repayment plans typically span many years (some-
times over twenty-five), it is unlikely that a Chapter 13 discharge will
occur after a substantial portion of the student loan repayment period
has passed because repayment plans generally span three to five
years. 172 With this in mind, some courts conclude that they are in no
better position speculating as to the debtor's circumstances through-
out the repayment period at the commencement of the Chapter 13
plan than at its conclusion. 173 Addressing this specific issue, the Cole-
man court noted that although "the Court may be required to specu-
late to a greater degree if it makes the determination a few years prior
to the debtor's discharge ... this difference of degree [is not] of con-
stitutional significance.' 1 74 Likewise, in Strahm, the court noted this
element "always requires the court to consider a future time period
where certainty is never available, whether evidence in regard to this
factor is presented in the early stages, or the later stages, of a Chapter
13 case."'1 75
Differing interpretations of when Brunner's second element ap-
plies in Chapter 13 cases indicates Brunner's inability to consistently
define undue hardship in Chapter 13 cases. Brunner's second element
uses impliedly time-sensitive language but fails to specify when, in the
course of the debtor's Chapter 13 plan, the element applies. This am-
biguity creates a situation in which some courts dismiss debtors' dis-
chargeability actions for lack of ripeness if filed prior to discharge,
while other courts entertain the merits of such actions when filed.
170. Raisor v. Educ. Loan Servicing Ctr. (In re Raisor), 180 B.R. 163, 166 (Bankr. E.D.
Tex. 1995).
171. Coleman v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Coleman), 333 B.R. 841, 846 (Bankr.
N.D. Cal. 2005) (emphasis added).
172. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d) (2000).
173. Id.; see also Ekenasi v. Educ. Res. Inst. (In re Ekanasi), 325 F. 3d 541, 547 (4th Cir.
2003) (noting that the court "can envision exceptional circumstances where the Brunner
factors could be predicted with sufficient certainty in advance of the conclusion of a Chap-
ter 13 proceeding.").
174. Coleman, 333 B.R. at 846.
175. Strahm, 327 B.R. at 322.
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Such inconsistency is problematic because it may encourage debtors
to file under Chapter 7, which contradicts the policy behind Chapter
13 and the hardship exception.
This inconsistency should be resolved by including an express
timing standard in Brunner that directs courts to resolve hardship pro-
ceedings when debtors seek such determinations. To prevent bank-
ruptcy abuse and protect creditors from the discharge of payable
debts, courts should reserve jurisdiction to vacate hardship determina-
tions if circumstances demonstrate that a Chapter 13 debtor, upon
completing the repayment plan, can repay the loans without undue
hardship.
3. Element 3: The Debtor Made a Good Faith Effort to Repay the
Loans
The Brunner test's final element is likewise subject to opposing
interpretations. To satisfy the third Brunner element, a debtor must
demonstrate that he or she has made a good-faith effort to repay the
loans prior to seeking discharge. 176 Many courts hold that a debtor
seeking discharge of student loans prior to completion of a repayment
plan fails to demonstrate a good-faith effort to repay the obligation. 177
Simply stated, "filing an undue hardship complaint at the beginning
of a case demonstrates a lack of good-faith under Brunner."'78
Other courts, however, adopt a far more flexible approach to
Brunner's third element. In analyzing the good faith of a Chapter 13
debtor, the Goranson court acknowledged that the debtor's "decision
to wait before filing the complaint might be consistent with 'good
faith"' but did not rely solely on that factor to conclude that the
debtor had satisfied the good-faith requirement.1 79 The court noted
that the debtor's good-faith effort was demonstrated by:
[T]he amount of time elapsed since the loans first became due
until the filing for Chapter 13 relief; the [d]ebtor's pursuit of
deferments; the length of time the [d]ebtor labored in Chapter 13
176. Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Serv. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir. 1987),
afg 46 B.R. 752 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
177. See, e.g., Pair v. U.S. Dep't of Educ. (In re Pair), 269 B.R. 719, 721 (Bankr. N.D. Ala.
2001) (adopting the Raisoranalysis and holding that good faith requires a debtor to at least
attempt to pay some part of the loan); Raisor v. Educ. Loan Servicing Ctr. (In re Raisor),
180 B.R. 163, 166-67 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1995) (finding that "by attempting to discharge the
PLUS Loans prior to the completion of the Plan, the Debtors are not demonstrating a
good faith effort to repay the obligation").
178. Pair, 269 B.R. at 720.
179. Goranson v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Goranson), 183 B.R. 52, 57
(Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1995).
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before seeking discharge of these debts; the fact that the failure to
make more than minimal payments on the student loans prior to
bankruptcy was a consequence of an inability to afford payments,
rather than of irresponsible choices, high living, or a manifest ef-
fort to take the easy way out; the [d] ebtor's diligent effort to obtain
part-time employment (which she obtained); a good-faith reason
currently to limit her employment to part-time employment; the
fact that the [d]ebtors' Plan is a maximum duration plan (60
months); and the fact that this Chapter 13 Plan is, by any measure,
these [d]ebtors' best effort.18 0
By allowing for an analysis of good faith based on a debtor's specific
circumstances and behavior rather than relying solely on the timing of
the dischargeability action, courts adopting this view seem more capa-
ble of making fair and equitable assessments of debtors' good faith
based on the many factors that may demonstrate such efforts.
The debate surrounding Brunner's third element again shows that
Brunner does not adequately define hardship for Chapter 13 debtors.
Although the term "good faith" does not appear time-sensitive, courts'
differing interpretations of the phrase show that the timing of dis-
chargeability actions plays a determinative role in Chapter 13 debtors'
hardship determinations. Because of this inequity and inconsistency,
debtors may be reluctant to file Chapter 13 in a jurisdiction that dis-
misses hardship actions as premature if filed prior to discharge. This is
problematic because it controverts congressional intent, both by dis-
couraging Chapter 13 in relation to Chapter 7 filings, and by impair-
ing Chapter 13 debtors' access to the undue hardship exception. In
Chapter 7, a debtor would receive an evaluation of the merits of his or
her action, while in Chapter 13, a debtor would find his or her identi-
cal action dismissed on purely procedural grounds. As the hardship
exception expressly extends to both Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 debt-
ors, the differing treatment that arises under the Brunner analysis
raises problems of inequity and inconsistency.
By adding timing language to the Brunner test, this inequity would
be eliminated. Furthermore, to remain consistent with congressional
intent, courts should entertain hardship determinations at the time of
filing and reserve jurisdiction to vacate such determination if circum-
stances demonstrate that a Chapter 13 debtor, upon completing the
repayment plan, can repay the loans without undue hardship.
180. Id.
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C. Neither the Statute nor the Bankruptcy Rule Resolve the Issue
of Ripeness
Based on the differing interpretations of Brunner's appropriate
time of application, the Brunner test presents an incomplete definition
of undue hardship. When presented with the timing question, courts
have consequently looked beyond Brunner for direction, turning to
available legislative rules and findings.' 8 1 However, little legislation ex-
ists dictating the timing of a dischargeability action, 8 2 and the availa-
ble legislation provides little clarity on the issue. 18 3
Under Rule 4007(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, a dischargeability
action may be filed "at any time,"'18 4 which suggests that a debtor may
indeed obtain a dischargeability determination any time after peti-
tioning for bankruptcy. Most courts, however, find that Rule 4007(b)
allows a debtor to file a dischargeability action at any time, but does
not grant courts jurisdiction to make a dischargeability determination
at any time.18 5 Rule 4007(b), has been viewed as a procedural tool
permitting debtors to file certain proceedings "when the matter is
ripe."' 86 Courts adopting this view conclude that since a Chapter 13
debtor does not receive a discharge until the repayment plan is com-
plete, the issue of student debt dischargeability is not ripe for review
until the end of the plan. 18 7 In courts favoring this approach, com-
plaints are typically dismissed as premature, and debtors are in-
structed to re-file their claim at, or near, the completion of their
Chapter 13 plan. 18 8
181. See, e.g., United Student Loans, Inc. v. Taylor (In re Taylor), 223 B.R. 747, 751
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998) (noting that the "filing of a complaint at anytime to discharge a
student loan based on undue hardship does not conflict with any statutory right or proce-
dure or with public policy").
182. The only legislation speaking to the timing of dischargeability actions is section
4007 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(b).
183. See infra notes 185 and 189 and accompanying text for a discussion of how courts
have been unable to reach a consensus on how to interpret the statute.
184. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(b).
185. "Bankruptcy Rule 4007 does not determine whether a proceeding is ripe for adju-
dication but merely permits the filing of certain types of proceedings when the matter is
ripe." Raisor v. Educ. Loan Servicing Ctr. (In re Raisor), 180 BR. 163, 167 (Bankr. E.D.
Tex. 1995); see also Bender v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Bender), 297 B.R. 126, 132
(D. Neb. 2003), affd,368 F.3d 846 (8th cir. 2004); Pair v. U.S. Dep't of Educ. (In re Pair),
269 B.R. 719, 721 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2001); Soler v. United States (In re Soler), 250 B.R. 694,
697 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2000).
186. Raisor, 180 B.R. at 167.
187. Soler, 250 B.R. at 697.
188. FED R. BANKR. P. 4007(b).
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However, courts that dismiss dischargeability actions in Chapter
13 on procedural grounds fail to consider a debtor's financial picture
at the time of filing, leading to the possible dismissal of meritorious
actions. Aside from this inequity, these courts may also unintention-
ally encourage student debtors to choose Chapter 7 over Chapter 13.
The end result is contrary to the congressional intent behind Chapter
13 legislation and the hardship exception itself.
Aligning more closely with congressional goals, other courts have
found that the plain language of Rule 4007(b) allows courts to enter-
tain a dischargeability action when filed.1 9 Because a debtor may file
a dischargeability action at any time, these courts generally conclude
that they may make a hardship determination at any time. 190 In sup-
port of this interpretation, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the
Ninth Circuit noted that "the filing of a complaint at any time to dis-
charge a student loan based on undue hardship does not conflict with
any statutory right or procedure or with public policy." 19' Indeed, it
seems unlikely that Congress intended to allow debtors to file a com-
plaint at any time, while simultaneously prohibiting courts from enter-
taining such actions.
While the latter interpretation of Rule 4007(b) follows the ex-
press language of the rule and seems to parallel congressional intent,
not all courts share in this view. Some courts continue to dismiss dis-
chargeability actions as premature if filed prior to plan completion, 92
which may unintentionally encourage student debtors to choose
Chapter 7 over Chapter 13. Such a result seems contrary to the con-
gressional policy behind Chapter 13 legislation, and appears to frus-
trate the purpose of the hardship exception. In addition, courts'
differing interpretations of Rule 4007(b) have led to inconsistent
treatment of debtors, and thus the Rule has failed to adequately re-
189. Andrews v. S.D. Student Loan Assistance Corp. (In re Andrews), 661 F.2d 702. 705
n.5 (8th Cir. 1981) ("We recognize that the bankruptcy court's determination of undue
hardship will necessarily involve a certain amount of speculation about the debtor's finan-
cial circumstances. We further recognize that the debtor's financial circumstances may
change in the future. For this reason we recommend that if the bankruptcy court deter-
mines that the debtor should not be granted a discharge on the grounds of undue hard-
ship, the bankruptcy court deny such relief without prejudice to the debtor's again seeking
relief under Rules Bankr. Proc .... ").
190. United Student Loans, Inc. v. Taylor (In re Taylor), 223 B.R. 747, 752 (B.A.P. 9th
Cir. 1998).
191. Id. at 751; see also Goranson v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Goran-
son), 183 B.R. 52, 53 n.1 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1995) (stating that under some circumstances
undue hardship may be addressed prior to completion of the Chapter 13 plan).
192. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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solve the timing debate. To ensure that all debtors, regardless of chap-
ter or jurisdiction, have equal access to the hardship exception, an
express timing standard should be added to Brunner: courts should
uniformly consider dischargeability actions when filed, and reserve ju-
risdiction to vacate the determination if the debtor is able to repay the
loans without undue hardship at the time of discharge.
IV. The Solution: Amend Brunner to Include a Timing
Standard and Maintain Jurisdiction Until Discharge
Occurs
A. Courts Should Evaluate Dischargeability Actions on Their
Merits When Filed
To promote fairness and equity among student debtors, regard-
less of chapter or jurisdiction, courts must prevent the issue of ripe-
ness from foreclosing dischargeability determinations prior to the
occurrence of Chapter 13 discharge. In light of the delayed discharge
in Chapter 13 cases, Brunner's lack of timing language has led most
courts to put off hardship analyses until a debtor completes his or her
repayment plan.' 93 Under a Brunner analysis, if the bankruptcy court
finds against the debtor on any of its three elements, the inquiry ends
and the student loan is deemed not dischargeable. 194 Since timing is
an issue at each stage of Brunner, the likelihood of a debtor prevailing
on all Brunner elements prior to plan completion is slim in many juris-
dictions. To the detriment of Chapter 13 debtors, therefore, many
courts may not consider potentially meritorious dischargeability ac-
193. Coleman v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Coleman), 333 B.R. 841, 846 (Bankr.
N.D. Cal. 2005) ("The majority of circuit courts that have addressed this issue have'...
concluded that the express language of § 1328(a) requires the determination to be made
at the time of discharge. One lower court observed that, while FRBP 4007(b) permits the
dischargeability action to be filed at any time, it does not provide that the issue of dis-
chargeability may be determined at any time.") (internal citations omitted).
194. Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Serv. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir. 1987),
affg46 B.R. 752 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
To establish that excepting a student loan debt from the discharge would impose
undue hardship, a debtor must prove three things: '(1) that she cannot maintain,
based on current income and expenses, a "minimal" standard of living for herself
and her dependents if forced to repay the loans; (2) that additional circum-
stances exist indicated that this state of affairs is likely to persist for a significant
portion of the repayment period of the student loans; and (3) that the debtor has
made good faith efforts to repay the loans.'
Coleman, 333 B.R. at 849 (emphasis added) (quoting Saxman v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. BJR
Corp. (In re Saxman), 325 F.3d 1168, 1172 (9th Cir. 2003)).
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tions simply because a debtor seeks a determination prior to plan
completion.
This problem may be easily eliminated by adding a uniform tim-
ing standard to Brunner. If the timing issue is resolved in the test itself,
courts applying Brunnerwould not be faced with the question of when
Brunner applies in Chapter 13 cases. Likewise, debtors would not be
subject to differing treatment regarding the hardship exception based
on the Chapter filed and jurisdiction chosen.
If a timing standard is added to Brunner, what time should con-
trol: that of discharge or the dischargeability action? Clearly, compel-
ling arguments have been made supporting both views. Some courts
reason that deciding dischargeability actions at or near discharge
avoids speculation as to the debtor's circumstances at the time of dis-
charge, and promotes Congress's aim of restricting the discharge of
student debt.'9 5 Other courts note, however, that deciding dis-
chargeability actions when filed promotes Congress's clear goal of en-
couraging Chapter 13 over Chapter 7,196 and is supported by the plain
language of Rule 4007(b).1 97
While both views are well-supported, the debate clearly tips in
favor of deciding dischargeability issues when filed. In addition to the
rationales provided by courts in support of this view, its soundness
rests on the fundamental purpose of bankruptcy law: to provide debt-
ors with a fresh financial start through discharge,' 98and to prevent
creditors from using aggressive and abusive collection practices. 199 As
bankruptcy law is largely focused on the protection of debtors,20 0 the
timing standard added to Brunner should reflect this debtor-friendly
principle. Debtors-not creditors-file hardship proceedings, and
they do so to determine the scope of their eventual discharge. The
195. See supra Part I.A.2.
196. See Goranson, 183 B.R. at 55-56 (allowing a debtor to choose a snap-shot date for
the application of the hardship exception; "[t]o do otherwise would be to penalize a
debtor for choosing Chapter 13 over Chapter 7"); see generally supra Part II.B.
197. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(b) (providing that a dischargeability action may be filed
"at any time").
198. See supra Part I.A. 1.
199. State "grab law" permitted and encouraged aggressive creditor remedies, such as
repossession and arrests. 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 15, 1300.LH[1].
200. Id. ("The fundamental aim of... all true bankruptcy laws is the displacement of
grab law, through the establishment of a uniform system for ratable asset distribution
among creditors. A more recent objective of ... bankruptcy law is to return the debtor to a
useful economic role in society by means of the 'fresh start,' through the discharge in
bankruptcy.").
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Brunner test, therefore, should give deference to the debtor's filing
decision and evaluate circumstances as they exist at the time of filing.
B. Benefits and Practical Consequences of the Solution
The benefits of deciding dischargeability actions on their merits
when filed are two-fold. First, the uniform practice may preserve debt-
ors' incentive to file under Chapter 13 rather than Chapter 7, thus
promoting the congressional intent underlying Chapter 13 legisla-
tion.20 1 Second, this approach may result in dischargeability determi-
nations early in the bankruptcy case, ultimately facilitating the
debtor's ability to obtain a fresh start. Faced with a long repayment
period, the Chapter 13 debtor would presumably like to know if re-
maining student debt would be discharged upon successful comple-
tion of a plan before committing to years of plan-payments.20 2 Along
these lines, the Strahm court noted that "if the [d]ebtor prevails ... a
number of options may be available to the [d] ebtor, which may im-
pact future collective proceedings in the chapter 13 case." 20 3 These
options include "modification of the chapter 13 plan, increased fund-
ing of the chapter 13 plan, accelerated distribution of funds in the
chapter 13 plan, conversion [to Chapter 7], dismissal or other op-
tions." 20 4 If, however, the debtor does not prevail, early resolution of
the issue may allow a debtor to modify his or her plan to prevent, for
example, the accrual of additional interest and penalties on the stu-
dent loan. 20 5
Despite these clear benefits, it must be reiterated that undue
hardship, as defined by Brunner, remains a difficult standard to
meet. 20 6 Even if courts entertained dischargeability actions when filed,
debtors would remain responsible for proving, by a preponderance of
201. See supra Part II.B.
202. Coleman v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Coleman), 333 B.R. 841, 849 (Bankr.
N.D. Cal. 2005).
203. Strahm v. Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp. (In re Strahm), 327 B.R. 319, 325
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2005) (noting that "as with any judicial determination impacting the
total, or partial, amount a debtor is required to pay in connection with a specific claim in
the Chapter 13 case, options become available which may have not been otherwise
available").
204. Id.
205. Craine v. United States (In re Craine), 206 B.R. 598, 601 (Bankr. D. Fla. 1997).
206. Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Serv. Corp. (In re Brunner), 46 B.R. 752, 753
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985), affd 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting that "[t]he existence of
the adjective 'undue' indicates that Congress viewed garden-variety hardship as [an] insuf-
ficient excuse for a discharge of student loans").
Summer 2007] NONDISCHARGEABILITY OF STUDENT LOANS
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
the evidence, 20 7 that repayment of a student loan would indeed cause
"undue hardship."20 8 The high hardship standard 20 9 benefits educa-
tional lenders, who may fear that Chapter 13 debtors, if given the op-
portunity, will file dischargeability actions early and often, and will
consequently be released from debt that may be manageable when
plan payments cease. However, resolving dischargeability actions
when filed will not likely result in the discharge of more student debt
because the debtor's burden under the hardship standard is so
substantial. 210
Furthermore, it is unlikely that more loans will be discharged if
courts adopt this solution because practical financial considerations
will likely force debtors to think twice before seeking a dis-
chargeability determination. The sheer cost of hiring an attorney for
the purpose of bringing a dischargeability action will presumably de-
ter debtors from repeated filings, which will therefore limit a debtor's
realistic ability to file multiple dischargeability actions and reserve re-
sources for those circumstances that truly warrant a hardship
discharge.
C. Reservation of Jurisdiction Would Prevent Unwarranted
Discharge
Considering the debtor's burden of proof and the practical cost
considerations of bringing an undue hardship action, it is unlikely
that more student loans will be discharged if the Brunner analysis ap-
plied uniformly at any time during the debtor's bankruptcy proceed-
ing. However, because Congress clearly intended student loans to be
nondischargeable except in extreme circumstances, any increase in
the discharge of educational debt may cause concern. A simple solu-
tion exists that would prevent this unlikely event: courts may reserve
jurisdiction over the action and give lenders the opportunity to vacate
the dischargeability determination if the debtor's circumstances
change so significantly that repayment of the educational loans would
not constitute an undue burden. Changed circumstances may include
207. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
208. Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Long), 271 B.R. 322, 328 (B.A.P. 8th Cir.
2002), rev'd on other grounds, 322 F.3d 549 (8th Cir. 2003).
209. See Ekenasi v. Educ. Res. Inst. (In re Ekenasi), 325 F.3d 541, 547 (4th Cir. 2003)
("[I]t will be most difficult for a debtor, who has advanced his education at the expense of
government-guaranteed loans, to prove with the requisite certainty that the repayment of
his student loan obligations will be an 'undue burden' on him.., when the debtor chooses
to make that claim far in advance of the expected completion date of his plan.").
210. Id.; see also Brunner, 46 B.R. at 756.
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a substantial salary increase, the receipt of an unexpected inheritance,
or lottery winnings.
This proposed solution would have a two-fold effect. First, al-
lowing lenders to contest discharge upon changed circumstances may
discourage debtors from filing dischargeability actions early in their
Chapter 13 plan. Knowing that an early determination may be va-
cated, a debtor seeking an undue hardship determination may choose
to wait until general discharge to prevent a later court action. Second,
debtors whose circumstances substantially improve after a dis-
chargeability determination would not be free from repayment of ed-
ucational loans; only those debtors who would, in fact, suffer undue
hardship if required to repay the debt would be relieved of their stu-
dent debt. Educational lenders would therefore be assured that those
debtors released from liability for repayment of student loans truly
demonstrate circumstances that justify the failure to repay student
loans.
Although maintaining jurisdiction over dischargeability actions
may increase the demand for limited judicial resources, policy consid-
erations in this context outweigh concerns for judicial efficiency. The
hardship exception calls for a careful analysis of competing considera-
tions: a debtor's chance at a fresh financial start contrasted with a
creditor's goal of avoiding uncollectible debts. These opposing inter-
ests should be viewed in light of Congress's goal of extending the
hardship exception to all student debtors while simultaneously
preventing abuses of the bankruptcy system. As circumstances may
change during the course of a debtor's repayment plan, this balance
may shift after dischargeability determinations have been made. Be-
cause each interest furthers fundamental congressional policies un-
derlying current bankruptcy law, a court's resources are well spent
making sure that the balance is thoroughly analyzed for the fairest
possible result.
V. Conclusion
As the cost of education continues to rise, outpacing increases in
salaries, educational debt will become increasingly burdensome on a
growing number of students. This country prides itself on innovation
and higher learning, and our nation would suffer enormously if prom-
ising students choose to forgo higher education for fear of unantici-
pated post-graduate insolvency. This prospect, although hypothetical,
is likely to become more realistic as student debts grow increasingly
difficult to discharge in bankruptcy.
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Presently, courts are in a position to reinterpret bankruptcy law
in this area and adopt a timing standard that addresses the practical
effect of the Brunner test in Chapter 13 cases. By allowing courts to
consider the merits of debtors' dischargeability actions when filed,
debtors could take full advantage of the undue hardship exception,
regardless of Chapter or jurisdiction. Congress expressly extended the
exception to Chapter 13 debtors, yet the Brunner test has made it
nearly impossible for Chapter 13 debtors to obtain relief under the
section prior to the occurrence of discharge. This problem, in light of
Congress's encouragement of Chapter 13 over Chapter 7 filings and
the Bankruptcy Code's silence on the timing issue, could be easily
eliminated by entertaining hardship determinations when filed. Since
timing is an issue unaddressed by Brunner, it may, and should, be re-
solved by adding a uniform timing standard to the Brunner analysis.
To offset any possibility that such standard would discharge more stu-
dent debt, courts should additionally reserve jurisdiction over the dis-
chargeability determination until discharge, in fact, occurs.
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